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• 'From the day they enter medical school, physicians are Laught t.o cherish 
and preserve life. However, there comes a time with the terminally iU or 
irreversible comatose patient that the physician must step back and, at the 
patient's or the family's request, allow the patient to die with dignity." [I) 
In 1988 more than three out of four physicians surveyed 
favored ''withdrawing life support systems, including food and 
water, from hopelessly ill or irreversibly comotose patients if 
they or their families request it.'' [2] Over 90% believed that 
physicians should initiate discussions with patients and their 
families on the use of withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. 
Yet more than half of these physi'cians were either uncertain or 
unsure of the legal risks and responsibilities surrounding 
decisions to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. 
The ''right-to-die'' movement has come a long way since the 
Quinlan [3] case captured our attention just a decade ago. At 
that time, both the public and the medical establishment waited 
anxiously as the court ruled in a case previously reserved to 
whispering in hospital corridors and discussions among medical 
ethicists. During the same year, California enacted the first 
Natural Death Act, granting statutory recognition to the ''living 
will." [4] 
In the last twelve years, the courts and the state legislatures, 
together with health care professionals, hospitals, medical 
ethicists, legal scholars, and the public have continued to 
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address the legal and ethical issues raised by foregoing life-
sustaining treatment. Progress has been made in opening up 
debate and reaching consensus on many of the issues. Clear 
legal trends have emerged, yet questions still remain. 
This article will first discuss the legal and ethical foundations 
that support the right to forego life-sustaining treatment. This 
right will then be applied to the competent patient. The greater 
challenge for the law, which _will then be analyzed, is how to 
preserve such a right for the incompetent patient. [5) The 
article will conclude by highlighting unresolved issues and new 
questions for further debate. 
THE RIGHT TO FOREGO TREATMENT: FOUNDATIONS 
It is now widely accepted by both the medical and legal 
community-as well as the public at large-that there exists a 
right to forego treatment. Both the common law right to sell-
determination and bodily integrity and the constitutional right 
to privacy provide the legal foundation for this right. 
''No right is held more sacred or is more carefully guarded by 
the common law than the right of every individual to the 
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraints 
or interference by others, unless by clear and unquestionable 
authority of law. •' [ 6} This common law right is recognized in 
both criminal and tort law. A bodily invasion without consent 
constitutes a battery or trespass. Beginning in the 1960s, the 
courts expanded their recognition of self-determination in the 
medical context to the development of the doctrine of informed 
consent. This tort doctrine provides that the health care 
provider has a duty to inform the patient of alternatives and 
risks to treatment prior to obtaining valid consent. Informed 
consent has evolved to where the right not to consent-or forego 
treatment-has been incorporated into the doctrine. Otherwise, 
the right to self-determination would not be fully realized. 
As the law of informed consent evolved, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in the Quinlan [7] case established another 
legal source for upholding the right to forego life-sustaining 
treatment: the constitutional right to privacy. Although the 
constitution does not explicitly mention a right to privacy, the 
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Quinlan court reasoned that, if the U.S. Supreme Court 
recognized such a right to protect the individual from state 
action which would limit such personal choices as contraception 
and a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain 
conditions [B), the right to privacy would also be broad enough 
to encompass a· patient's decision to decline medical treatment. 
[9] The Quinlan court determined that a patient in a persistent 
vegetative state, with no reasonable chance of recovery, had the 
right to have the respirator sustaining her life withdrawn. Since 
_she was incompetent to express her wishes, her quardian and 
family would act on her behalf to exercise her right to forego 
further life-sustaining treatment. 
The court did recognize that the right was not absolute and 
would have to be balanced against the claimed interests of the 
state in the ''preservation of life and defense of the right of the 
physician to administer medical care according to his best 
judgment." [10} As more state courts faced such cases, four 
state interests emerged: (1) the preservation of life; (2) the 
prevention of suicide; (3) protection of minor children; and (4} 
protection of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. [11} 
The most important state interest, at least in theory, is the 
preservation of life. In practice, it is now clear that this interest 
would not outweigh the right of a patient to refuse 
life-sustaining treatment. Suicide prevention is generally not an 
issue in right to die caseg because the patient does not inflict the 
illness deliberately on himself. If the patient has no minor 
children or the family consents, the third interest is usually not 
at issue. Finally, the ethical standards of the medical profession 
have evolved since Quinlan to a point where the profession 
supports the right of the patient to refuse treatment. 
The United States Supreme Court has yet to hear a case 
involving the right to forego treatment but, as noted above, the 
New Jersey court's interpretation of the constitutional right to 
privacy should extend to recognition of such a right. [12] In the 
meantime, the right has evolved in most states and federal 
courts to a point where it is protected by both the common law 
and the constitutional right to privacy. Both of these legal 
sources provide the legal foundation for promoting the values of 
self-determination, bodily integrity. and personal autonomy in 
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medical decision-making. 
To a large extent, the development of law in this area has 
been influenced by the evolution of medical ethics. In the early 
1980s, an influential series of reports were released by the 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical· Problems in 
Medicine and Behavioral Research, including one entitled 
"Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment." {13} It 
became clear from the report and the judicial decisions that 
followed that there was no clear ethical nor legal distinction in 
this area between withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment. The right to forego treatment would include both the 
withdrawing and withholding of treatment. 
Physicians and health care institutions believed-and many 
still do-that the act of withdrawing a respirator or removing a 
feeding tube is an affirmative act that hastens death. [141 Once 
such treatment is initiated, it must be continued, regardless of 
its value to the patient. On the other hand, the withholding of 
· such treatment is ethically and legally permissible. 
In fact, it is often more difficult to know how a patient will 
respond to a treatment without a time-limited trial. This is 
particularly true for the emergency patient. Accordingly, it may 
be contrary to medical standards to avoid placing a patient on a 
respirator or inserting a feeding tube merely because of the 
incorrect belief that such procedures could not be terminated. 
As the New Jersey court noted in the Conroy case [15J, such a 
• distinction could in fact discourage families and physicians from 
even attempting certain types of care and thereby force them 
into hasty and premature decisions to allow a patient to die. To 
date, only the State of Ohio has suggested that different pro-
cedures are required for withdrawing and withholding 
treatment and only the Mississippi living will statute authorizes 
withdrawal of treatment explicitly, but nowhere expressly 
provides for withholding treatment. [16] 
For the competent patient, it should be relatively easy to 
exercise the right to have treatment withheld or withdrawn. The 
patient decides and communicates his decision to the health 
care provider. For the patient without such capacity, the 
exercise of such a right is more problematic. It is the application 
of the right for the competent patient that will now be 
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addressed. 
THE COMPETENT PATIENT 
All patients are presumed to be competent. Legally, only a 
court has the authority to declare a person ''incompetent.'' In 
practice, a patient is competent or, more correctly, has the 
capacity to make treatment decisions when he can understand 
the relevant information, reflect on it according with his values 
and goals, and communicate with caregivers.· [17] Most often 
this determination is not a problem. If the patient is unconscious 
or severely retarded, for example, he is clearly incapable of 
making a decision. The problem becomes more difficult when 
fear, mental illness or physical illness cloud the patient's 
judgment. In practice, if a patient is incapacitated by a condition 
that is temporary (i.e., severe pain, intoxication, withdrawal) 
any determination on competency and treatment decisions 
should be postponed, if at all possible. 
Very few cases deal with defining capacity to consent to or 
refuse treatment, although most states have procedures for a 
court to make a finding of legal competency. Generally, the 
courts are wary about second-guessing the choice of a patient. 
Even if a patient's refusal to be treated seems irrational to the 
physician, this does not mean that the patient is incompetent. A 
patient may be depressed, have periods of confusion and a 
distorted sense of time but, if capable of understa:Q.ding the 
consequences of the decision to refuse treatment, the court will 
not declare the patient incompetent. (18] A diagnosed mental 
illness or even commitment to a mental institution, per se, does 
not mean that a patient is not competent to refuse treatment if 
he understands the consequences of the decision. [19] 
Although the reasonableness of the decision to refuse treatment 
is not the standard for competency, in practice the nature of the 
treatment and the prognosis may influence whether the health 
care provider takes the issue to court and whether the court 
deems the patient incompetent. [20] 
In most cases, the determination of competency is not at issue 
and a number of recent court decisions have affirmed the 
patient's right to refuse treatment regardless of prognosis. [21] 
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Consistent with the value underlying informed consent, the 
health care provider is to honor the refusal of the patient. The 
California court held that an incurable, but not terminally ill 
patient, had a right to withdraw from a respirator even if such 
action would hasten his death. To do otherwise ·would be to 
frustrate the very essence of the right of informed consent and 
the constitutional right to privacy. {22] In the much-publicized 
Bouvia case [23], the same court held that a quadriplegic, who 
was not terminally ill, had the right to order the withdrawal of a 
nasogastric feeding tube even if such action would hasten or 
cause her death. The court determined that such a decision was 
neither medical nor legal, but hers alone to make. Most recently 
the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that a competent 
woman, with an incurable neurological disease but in which 
death was not imminent, had the right to have a respirator 
removed at home. [24) The court recognized that her life was 
filled with pain and that it would be unfair and unjust to force 
· her to live any longer. 
THE INCOMPETENT PATIENT 
Most of the ''right-to-die'' cases in the last decade have not 
involved a competent patient. Not surprisingly the doctrine of 
informed consent has protected the right of the competent ,, 
patient to refuse treatment and this has been accepted by both 
the medical and legal communities. The challenge has been in 
defining the parameters of the right of the patient incapable of 
making his own treatment decisions. Although state courts 
decide each case on a unique set of facts and state laws vary, 
certain trends do emerge on the two major issues at stake: (1) 
what decision-making criteria should be applied when exer-
cising the right of the incompetent patient to forego life-sustain-
ing treatment? and (2) who should be making such decisions? 
Decision-making Criteria 
At this point it is appropriate to return to the case of Karen 
Quinlan, a young adult in a persistent vegetative state. In 1975 
her father first petitioned a New Jersey court to be appointed 
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her guardian for permission to withdraw her from a respirator. 
No request was made to remove her feeding tube. Her attending 
physicians and the hospital would not remove the respirator 
because they deemed it contrary to medical, ethical, and legal 
standards. They feared the potential of both criminal and civil 
liability. 
Ultimately, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided that 
Karen, if competent, could have exercised her constitutional 
right of privacy to refuse what appeared at the time to be life-
sustaining treatment. [25] This right which outweighed any 
state interest would be lost if it could not be exercised by 
another on her behalf. The court set out the following balancing 
test: ''the state interests contra weakens and the individuar s 
right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases 
and the prognosis dims.'' [26] Her treatment was sufficiently 
invasive and her condition and profnosis sufficiently dim as to 
allow life-sustaining treatment to be terminated. If Karen's 
guardian, family, and attending physicians concurred and an 
"ethics committee" [27] confirmed no reasonable possibility 
that she might recover to a sapient state, the respirator could be 
withdrawn and all parties would be immune from civil and 
criminal liability. 
Since the Quinlan case, most state courts have considered 
cases involving vegetative state. A few cases have involved the 
chronically ill who may lack decision-making capacity because of 
senility but are not facing life-threatening conditions and are not 
unconscious. [28] A few more cases have dealt with the 
mentally retarded or the "never competent" patient. [29] From 
these cases have emerged decision-making criteria for the 
termination of treatment for the incompetent patient. 
Decision-making criteria set standards for determining what 
the incompetent patient would have decided if capable of 
communicating his own decision. This is commonly referred to 
as ''substituted judgment,'' an approach adopted by most of the 
jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. Such an approach 
requires the surrogate decision-maker to act in accordance with 
explicit directives, values, and preferences of the p~tient. 
Although this may be a difficult task, most jurisdictions cling to 
this approach as the best way to preserve the right to self-
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determination for the incompetent patient. 
Courts attach great significance to evidence of prior wishes of 
the patient while competent. The best evidence of a patient's 
wishes is the signing of an advanced directive in which the 
patient, while competent, expresses his wishes with respect to 
life-sustaining treatment if he becomes incompetent. Thirty-
eight states and the District of Columbia have now enacted 
natura) death, living will or . death-with-dignity statutes that 
grant statutory recognition to such advanced directives. Even in 
those states without such statutes, the courts have viewed the 
existence of such a directive as strong evidence of the patient's 
wishes~ 
Typically, living will statutes provide for refusing life-sus-
taining treatment when the patient's condition becomes 
"terminal" and/or death is "imminent." Statutes take varied 
approaches to defining what constitutes "life-sustaining" 
treatment. Some statutes specifically include artificial feeding 
· and hydration and others specifically omit such procedures. All 
statutes provide for detailed procedures for executing the 
advanced directive and many include a model form to be filled 
out by the person when competent. Perhaps. most significantly, 
all statutes provide immunity for health care providers who act 
in good faith to comply with a properly executed living will. [30] 
The enactment of a living will statute may be more symbolic 
than either necessary or effective in guaranteeing the right to 
refuse treatment to the incompetent patient. As noted above, it 
does not cover the patient in a persistent vegetatiVe state such 
as Karen Quinlan. Furthermore, many of the statutes are 
ambiguous in their language about which "life-sustaining" 
treatments may be withheld or withdrawn-most notably 
artificial food and hydration and antibiotics. 
On a positive note, they do codify the state's recognition-
with or without a state court ruling-of the right of the patient to 
terminate treatment over the state's interest in preserving life. 
Immunity for health care providers from civil and criminal 
liability should also encourage more dialogue between patients 
and providers over long-term treatment plans. [31] 
In any case, the living will does not represent the exclusive 
vehicle for exercising the right to forego treatment. Another 
(488) JHHRA SPRING 1989 
statutory alternative gaining much popularity is the Durable 
Power of Attorney (DPA). All states and the District of 
Columbia have statutes which enable a competent person to 
appoint a proxy decision-maker when the individual is no longer 
competent to make decisions. Most of these statutes were not 
passed to deal specifically with medical decision-making but 
rather with financial matters. Yet, in a recent case, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the right of a proxy, appointed 
while a persistent vegetative patient was still competent, to act 
on her behalf to have the nursing home provider remove her 
nasogflstric feeding tube. [32] 
A number of states have recently amended their general DPA 
statutes or passed new statutes which specifically provide for a 
proxy to make medical decisions. Any competent person may 
appoint a proxy to act on his behalf once he is declared 
incapable of making his medical decisions. A proxy may have 
the power to: provide, withhold or withdraw consent to specific 
medical procedures, including CPR, antibiotics, artificial 
feeding and hydration, and blood transfusions; interpret a living 
will and resort to courts, if necessary, to obtain court authoriza-
tion regarding treatment decisions or to request civil damages 
for not honoring the proxy's decision. [33] 
Since most patients do not leave explicit instructions nor 
execute advanced directives [341, the next best evidence 
available may consist of conversations with family, friends, and 
physicians. A patient's personal beliefs, values, religious 
principles, and even consistent attitudes about past medical 
care may be of some relevance when attempting to evaluate how 
the patient would weigh the benefits and burdens of life-
sustaining treatment. 
If there is no reliable evidence, the surrogate may apply the 
''best interests'' test. This is the traditional guardianship 
standard in which the surrogate objectively weighs the benefits 
and burdens of treatment to determine how a reasonable person 
in the patient's circumstances would promote his well-being. 
{35] Under no circumstance is the social worth of the patient to 
enter into the formulation. This is particularly critical when the 
patient is mentally retarded and institutionalized. 
Although a presumption for treatment may exist, the court 
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has recognized that it is not always in a patient's best interests 
to continue life-sustaining treatment. [36] Recently, ethical 
guidelines have emerged for applying the "best interests" 
standard to important categories of patients. 
For the patient who is terminally ill, the major considerations 
are whether foregoing treatment will allow the patient to avoid 
the burden of prolonged dying with pain or suffering and 
whether the patient has the potential benefit of achieving some 
satisfaction if he survives for a longer period. [37] 
For the patient with a severe illness or disabling condition 
that is irreversible, the major consideration is whether termina-
tion of treatment would be preferable to a patient's life largely 
devoid of opportunities to achieve satisfaction or full of pain or 
suffering with no corresponding benefits. [38] 
For a patient with irreversible loss of consciousness, the 
benefit/burden analysis is different. Such patients do not 
experience pain. The only possible benefit to them of treatment 
is that the diagnosis is wrong and they will regain conscious-
ness. Thus, the major considerations are whether a reasonable 
person in the patient's circumstances would find that this 
benefit, as well as the benefit to the family and friends, (i.e., 
satisfaction in caring for the patient and meaningfulness of 
continued survival) is outweighed by the emotional suffering 
and financial burden of treatment. [39J 
The· evolution of ethiCal standards has, also influenced the 
legal parameters of defining ''life-sustaining treatment.'' 
Historically, the courts adhered to a distinction between extra-
ordinary and ordinary care. A patient or his surrogate could 
refuse those treatments and procedures labeled extaordinary, 
but not those that were deemed ordinary. In the Quinlan case, in 
fact, the mechanical respirator was labeled as an extraordinary 
treatment. 
Within the last few years, the focus has shifted to the with-
holding or withdrawal of artificial feeding and hydration. 
Adopting the position of the President's Commission, the courts 
have either expanded the definition of extraordinary to include 
such treatment or have abandoned the distinction as unhelpful 
and confusing altogether. [40] The courts have also been 
influenced by the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 
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which issued a major opinion in 1986 that it is ethically permis-
sible to withhold all life-prolonging treatment, including 
artificial nutrition and hydration, from permanently unconscious 
or dying patients in accordance with their wishes or those of 
their surrogates. [41] 
To date courts in over 13 states have ruled that the right to 
refusal is no different for artificial feeding and hydration than 
for other forms of medical treatment. The position of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court in the Conroy case . has since been 
adopted by a number of other state courts. "Analytically, 
artificial feeding by means of a nasogastric tube or intravenous 
infusion can be seen as equivalent to artificial breathing by 
means of a respirator, Both prolong life through mechanical 
means when the body is no longer able to perform a vital bodily 
function on its own." [421 
Although the common law has moved forward in this area, 
there is still much confusion on this issue. Ironically, part of the 
confusion is based on the living will statutes. Six states clearly 
do indicate that an advanced directive can provide for the with-
drawal of artificial feeding not necessary for comfort care. Seven 
others explicitly exclude it as a procedure that may be rejected. 
A number of other statutes provide that food and water may not 
be rejected, but do not specificially define artificial feeding and 
hydration. Other statutes make no mention of the issue at all. 
{ 43] In spite of this confusion. at least three state courts 
(Florida, Maine, and Californi~) tha~ have addressed the issue 
have held that restrictive statutes cannot be read to limit the 
constitutional and common law rights of patients to have arti-
ficial feeding tubes withdrawn. [ 44] 
Another life-sustaining treatment or procedure worthy of 
particular attention is emergency resuscitation for cardiac arrest 
and pulmonary failure (CPR). Traditionally, many hospitals 
would act as if there was a Do Not Resuscitate Order (DNR) for a 
hopelessly ill patient, but would not document it in the chart. 
The decision whether to resuscitate was often not discussed 
with the patient and/or his surrogate, but rather handled as a 
medical decision that was within the discretion of the attending 
physician. A number of state medical societies, the New York 
State legislature, and the Joint Commission for the Accreditation 
JHHRA SPRING 1989 (491) 
of Hospitals (JCAH) have recently addressed this issue. 
If a hopelessly ill patient is competent, the emerging standard 
is that the patient should decide on whether a DNR order should 
be made, based on the patient's understanding of medical 
diagnosis and prognosis. In other words, the DNR order should 
be treated like all other medical decisions in which the patient 
has the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. {45] If the 
patient is not competent, the. decision should be reached by 
consultation between physician and family members or the legal 
guardian. Once a decision is made, it should be documented in 
the nredical record. Any significant improvement would void the 
order. [46) 
Who Should Decide? 
Decision-making criteria enable the surrogate decision-maker 
to exercise the incompetent patient's right to forego life-
. sustaining treatment. To accomplish this role best, guidelines 
have evolved over who this surrogate decision-maker should be. 
Traditionally, the physician relied on the family to assist in 
making medical decisions for the incompetent patient. Such 
a medical custom makes sense, given the family's unique rela-
tionship with the patient. As the Quinlan court noted, the family 
has knowledge of and concern for the welfare of the family 
member. Of course, it is possible that family members may have 
different values and may oe unable to separate financial or 
emotional concerns from decision-making. But, absent a 
showing of bad faith or a physician's belief that the family does 
not have the welfare of the patient at stake, the family should be 
the primary decision-maker. 
Until very recently, the only way to ensure that the physician 
or institution would not be subject to civil or criminal liability for 
relying on a family member to consent to withdrawing or with-
holding treatment was to go to court either to have a family 
member appointed as a guardian or to obtain judicial approval 
of the decision itslef. [ 47] A clear consensus has emerged that 
going to court is too burdensome, too expensive, and inapprop-
riate in most cases since the court is ill-equipped to make such 
personal and complex ethical decisions. In recent years, at least 
(492) JHHRA SPRING 1989 
half of the states, either by court opinion or statute, have 
explicitly authorized the family of adult patients to authorize 
termination of treatment without going to court. [48] 
Two years ago, the New Jersey Supreme Court set out com-
prehensive guidelines for family decision-making. [49] The 
court declared the family as the primary decision-maker in spite 
of the fact that New Jersey had no statute on point. With 
concurrence by the attending physician and confirmation of the 
medical condition by two independent physicians, the family 
without a court order had the right to have treatment refused on 
behalf of the incompetent patient. There need _not be clear and 
convincing evidence of what the patient would have wanted, but 
rather the family is to do the best they can under the circum-
stances to make good faith decisions based on their knowledge 
of the family member. [50] 
State statutes also provide recognition of the family as 
primary decision-maker without court intervention. The 
"substituted judgment" statute provides a priority list of 
persons the provider is to tum to for consent to treatment. 
Statutes vary as to the conditions in which the surrogate may 
also authorize the termination of life-sustaining treatment. 
Informed consent and living will statutes may also be a source of 
authority for the family surrogate to request termination of life-
sustaining treatment. [51] A durable power of attorney may 
also specify a family member (or friend) as the proxy for 
decisions. 
O{ course, if there is disagreement among the family, 
evidence of bad faith or no family member available, the family 
will not be relied on as the surrogate decision-maker. (52] The 
next most likely approach will be the appointment of a guardian 
or conservator. All states and the District of Columbia have 
statutes that provide for such appointment, but they differ as to 
whether they specify authority for health care decisions. Either 
case law or statute will provide that the guardian may have the 
authority to make decisions about the withholding or withdrawal 
of life-sustaining treatment without court ratification or review. 
[53] A few guardianship statutes do reserve "life-and-death'' 
medical decisions to the court. 
Even in those states in which the court does not routinely 
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require court approval, there will be disputed cases in which the 
court will either approve a surrogate's decision or make the 
treatment decision directly. When the treatment decision 
involves the institutionalized patient who was never competent 
the court may take an active role. · ' 
Over the last few years, there has been heightened interest in 
the use of institutional ethics committees for resolving the 
complex issues raised by foregoing life-sustaining treatment. 
Such committees, with a diverse membership of physicians, 
nurses, ethicists, other professionals, and the public, could 
advise on various ethical and social considerations surrounding 
treatment decisions. Although a few courts have looked to 
prognosis committees to verify the medical condition of an 
incompetent patient, case law and statutes do not grant ethics 
committees authority to serve as the surrogate decision-maker 
for the incompetent patient. [54] As ethics committees evolve 
in more institutional settings, they should take on a more active 
role in facilitating decision-making outside of the courtroom. 
Generally, the trend has been to remove uncontroversial 
cases from the court's jurisdiction. Yet a number of unnecessary 
cases will continue to come to court. Based on an unrealistic 
assessment of liability risk, health care providers will continue 
either to seek the court's protection prior to terminating 
tr~atment or force families to go to court to order them to honor 
the family's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment on behalf of 
the incompetent family member. Thus, an under~tanding on the 
currect status of liability risk is in order. 
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY 
A misunderstanding of the law and a fear of liability continue 
to pervade medical practice in this area. To date, there has not 
been one successful prosecution of criminal charges against a 
physician or health care institution reported for withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatment, including the removal of a feeding 
tube. [55] Nor has there been a single case reported for civil 
liability in which a physician was found negligent pursuant to a. 
family's request to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining 
treatment. 
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However, there have been a few cases reported recently in 
which the court has recognized a battery action for damages for 
failure to abide by the wishes of the patient and/or family for 
withholding or withdrawing treatment. The Ohio Court of 
Appeals held that maintaining a comatose woman on a 
respirator without her consent was actionable battery, [56] The 
California court also recognized a cause of action, including the 
payment of attorney fees (under its private attorney's general 
statute) for a hospital's failure to remove a competent patient on 
a respirator against his will and that of his family. [57] In the 
Bouvia case, the California court maintained a cause of action 
for damages based on her being forced fed against her will and 
for attorney fees. [58] 
In practice, it is not easy for a plaintiff to win such cases 
against health care providers. The provider may appear very 
sypathetic, it may be hard to prove knowing disregard for the 
patient's wishes, and damages will be very difficult to assess. 
The possibility of payment for attorney fees. however, may be 
enough of an incentive to honor the right of the patient orm. his 
surrogate decision-maker to refuse treatment. 
UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND NEW QUESTIONS: HIGHUGHTS 
Although legal and ethical trends have evolved over the last 
decade, unresolved issues remain and new questions emerge. A 
few are highlighted for future debate: 
• 
1. Accommodating Conflicting Beliefs 
When a physician's personal or religious beliefs conflict with 
a patient • s or surrogates's decision to terminate life-sustaining 
treatment, the physician may transfer the patient to another 
physician and be subject to liability for abandonment if 
appropriate arrangements for transfer are not made in good 
faith. Both common law and the living will statutes provide for 
such an accommodation. Should the health care institution have 
the same right when its objections are based on ethical and 
religious principles and not be based on the unrealistic fear of 
liability or convenience? 
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To date, the courts are split on this "accommodation." The 
Massachusetts Supreme Court only required that a hospital that 
refused to remove a feeding tube based on its ethical principles 
cooperate in the transfer of the patient to another facility. {591 
In a similar case, a New York court ordered a ho~pital either to 
remove the artificial feeding and hydration tubes from the 
patient or assist in his transfer to his home or another facility. 
The hospital refused to remove the tubes and transfer to another 
facility was arranged. [ 60] · 
On the other hand, a California court held that a hospital 
could not hide behind its religious principles in not removing a 
patient from a respirator against his will. [61] In the Jobes 
case, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to force the 
transfer of a nursing home patient whose family won the right to 
have her feeding tube removed in contradiction to the nursing 
home's policy written after her arrival. [62] In another New 
Jersey decision, a lower court denied a hospital's request either 
to have a severely neurologically impaired patient fed artifici-
ally, discharged or transferred to another facility. To force the 
patient to be transferred, if she refused the feeding tube, would, 
in the court's opinion, be to expose her to hardship and distress 
in an extremely difficult time in her life. As unpleasant as it 
might be for the staff to watch her die, their suffering could be 
less than hers if forced to move. [ 63] A Colorado trial court, 
when faced with a similar case, supported the right of a 
competent patient over ,the institutional "conscience" of the 
health care facility to have his feeding tube removed without 
being transferred to another facility. [ 64] 
In practice, it may often be difficult for the patient or the 
institution to find another facility willing to accept the patient. 
As more facilities address this issue in advance, they may set 
policies that prohibit the removal of feeding tubes. If so, will 
patients be able to exercise the rights that courts and legis-
latures have now granted? 
2. Too Much Treatment? 
On the other hand, there may be patients or surrogates who 
want all treatment provided, even when the provider deems it 
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medically inappropriate under the circumstances. If a patient or 
his surrogate has the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, is 
there a corollary right to demand that all means be utilized to 
keep the patient alive? When can the healh care professional 
and the institution say "NO MORE" without risking liability? 
How will the standard of care emerge in the future for the hope-
lessly ill? Will a consensus emerge in which it is deemed unjust 
in our society to provide unnecessary and inappropriate treat-
ment (over and above supportive care) to those who have no 
reasonable chance of recovery or return to a sapient life? [65] 
To date, there is little guidance on this issue. 
3. Qudlity of Life 
How far are we willing to extend the right of a surrogate to 
refuse treatment for a patient who is neither terminally ill nor in 
a persistent vegetative state, but rather is chronically ill and 
senile? Typically, this is the elderly patient often institution-
alized in a nursing home. How can we quantify benefit and 
burden for this patient? How much significance should we 
attach to recovery, side effects, intrusiveness and severity of 
treatment, and ability to cooperate in care? [ 66] And how will 
such decisions be influenced by cost implications? How can we 
continue to avoid making judgments about the ''social worth'' of 
such patients? 
Furthermore, what quality of life will the treatment of the 
AIDS patient raise at different stages of the disease? Use of 
antibiotics to cure infection may stabilize the patient for a while 
until the next infection surfaces. How will the benefit/burden 
ratio be calculated? What is deemed a life-sustaining treatment 
and at what time in the course ofthe illness? AIDS dementia may 
cause the patient to lose capacity temporarily to make decisions 
about courses of treatment. Under the circumstances, when 
should an advanced directive, if executed, become operational? 
4. Redefining the Family and Appropriate Decision-Makers 
It is well-established that the family is accepted as the 
primary decision-maker for the incompetent patient. Yet the 
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traditional definition of the family may not be appropriate in a 
number of circumstances. For example, what about the gay 
AIDS patient who becomes incompetent and has not appointed a 
proxy decision-maker? Should not his lover of ten years be his 
family? And what about the senile patient in a nursing home 
who has no family? 
Must one go to court to get a guardian appointed or are there 
other alternatives to assuring that the interests of the patient 
are being protected? Clearly, the patient's health care provider 
should not act as the surrogate unless the patient had previously 
designated the provider to act in that role. {67] Perhaps an 
expanded role for the ethics committee or the ombudsman may 
b~ appropriate? Another possibility to pursue is the "surrogate 
committee'' to provide surrogate decision-makers for those 
patients without capacity who lack family. [68] Whether the 
"stranger" surrogate should have more limited discretion and 
be subject to closer review than a family surrogate is still open 
to question. Clearly, we must continue to develop and evaluate 
mechanisms for protecting the rights of the incompetent patient 
in the most effective and efficient manner. 
CONCLUSION 
The problems just highlighted must be put in perspective. It 
was just a decade age thai the Quinlan case captured national 
attention. Since then, legal and ethical foundations for the right 
to forego treatment have become well-established. For the 
competent patient, the right is relatively easy to apply. For the 
incompetent patient, the law has moved toward the develop-
ment of decision-making criteria and a presumption that the 
family, and not the court, make treatment decisions on behalf of 
the patient. State legislatures have also made much progress in 
promoting the development of advanced directives and the 
appointment of proxies for medical decisions. And the medical 
community has recognized its duty to initiate discussions with 
the patient and his family on the use or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment. Hopefully, open dialogue will reduce the 
risk of liability and increase prospective planning for medical 
decision~making. 
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